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proposals from the literature on pejoratives provide some interesting 
insights as to how to flesh out a pragmatic analysis of the evaluative 
content of thick terms. Väyrynen himself suggested a comparison 
between his view on thick terms and the analysis of slurs put forward 
in Bolinger’s proposal in a talk (Pekka Väyrynen, “Evaluatives and 
pejoratives”, Handout for Linguistics Seminars-Scuola Normale Superiore, 
Pisa, 2016). I shall add that also Nunberg’s and Rappaport’s propos-
als are very relevant in this respect.
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Epistemic Angst: Radical Skepticism and the Groundlessness 
of Our Believing, by Duncan Pritchard. New Jersey: Princeton 
University Press, 2016, 239 pages, ISBN: 9780691167237.
Duncan Pritchard’s new book constitutes a continuation of his re-
search into the problem of scepticism. It is a version of a series of 
lectures he gave at Soochow University in Taiwan in 2013 and an 
amendment to the theory contained in his previous book: Epistemo-
logical Disjunctivism (Oxford, 2012).
Pritchard’s diagnosis is that the source of scepticism is not an in-
consistency ingrained in our pre-philosophical intuitions; instead, he 
thinks that illegitimate ways in which those intuitions have been inter-
preted philosophically are what give rise to scepticism. His purpose 
is therefore to purge our intuitions of philosophical distortions and in 
this way to remove the threat of radical scepticism, which manifests 
itself through epistemic angst: the fear that there is in fact no knowledge 
of the external world. Pritchard analyses and attempts to respond to 
the two sceptical paradoxes which allegedly cause epistemic angst: 
the first is based on the principle of underdetermination; the second, 
on the principle of closure. Each of these paradoxes is formed of an 
inconsistent triad of claims. Pritchard’s formulation of the sceptical 
paradox based on underdetermination is as follows (p. 32):
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(1) One cannot have rational support that favors one’s belief that 
one is sitting at one’s desk over a brain in a vat hypothesis.
(2) If one cannot have rational support that favors one’s belief 
that one is sitting at one’s desk over a brain in a vat hypoth-
esis, then one does not know that one is sitting at one’s desk.
(3) One knows that one is sitting at one’s desk.
This paradox arises due to the inconsistency (a real one, accord-
ing to Pritchard) of the triad composed of three claims correspond-
ing to (1)-(3) in the paradox above:
(1) One cannot have rational support that favors one’s belief in an 
everyday proposition over an incompatible radical sceptical 
hypothesis.
(2) The principle of underdetermination.
(3) One has widespread everyday knowledge.
Pritchard employs the following version of the principle of un-
derdetermination:
(UNDERDETERMINATION) If S knows that p and q describe 
incompatible scenarios, and yet S lacks a rational basis that favors 
p over q, then S lacks knowledge that p.
Pritchard denies (1) in the triad and paradox: in the good case the 
subject does have support favouring the claim of being sitting at one’s 
desk over being a brain in a vat. In this review, however, I will not 
dwell on the solution to the paradox based on underdetermination 
that is offered in Epistemic Angst, because it does not go beyond what 
Pritchard already proposed in Epistemological Disjunctivism. What has 
changed with respect to the previous book is that Pritchard now ad-
mits that disjunctivism needs to be enhanced if it is to successfully 
deal with the second sceptical paradox: that based on closure.
This is how Pritchard reconstructs the closure-based sceptical 
paradox (p. 15):
(1) One cannot know that one is not a brain in a vat.
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(2) If one cannot know that one is not a brain in a vat, then one 
cannot know that one is sitting at one’s desk.
(3) One knows that one is sitting at one’s desk.
This paradox again arises due to the inconsistency (which in this 
case, according to Pritchard, is only apparent; I will return to this 
issue later) of the triad composed of the following three claims that 
correspond to (1)-(3) in this paradox:
(1) One is unable to know the denials of radical skeptical hypoth-
eses.
(2) The principle of closure.
(3) One has widespread everyday knowledge.
Pritchard appeals to the principle of closure in the following 
form:
(CLOSURE) If S knows that p, and S competently deduces from p 
that q, thereby forming a belief that q on this basis while retaining 
knowledge that p, then S knows that q.
The problem with closure that bothers Pritchard is that one can-
not have (1), (2) and (3) at the same time. Endorsing disjunctivism 
yields a commitment to (3). Rejection of (2) is too revisionary to be 
taken as an option by Pritchard. It is also difficult to deny (1), and 
just bite the bullet by saying that one can know that one is not in a 
sceptical scenario (p. 163) — this is effectively denying a widespread 
and strong intuition. So, since Pritchard wants to save all three el-
ements of the triad, he argues that they are not inconsistent after 
all. In his attempt to show this he appeals to Wittgenstein’s idea of 
hinge commitments. According to that idea, negations of sceptical 
hypotheses (i.e., hinge commitments) are not susceptible to ratio-
nal evaluation; in this respect they differ from ordinary beliefs. His 
interpretation of hinge commitments, together with disjunctivism, 
form a biscopic solution to the problem of scepticism. In this way, 
paradox based on underdetermination is brought within the scope of 
a single solution (disjunctivism); and that based on closure is brought 
within the scope of another (hinge commitments).
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Pritchard’s solution to closure-based paradox relies upon the 
non-belief reading of hinge commitments. Pritchard analyses various 
fragments of Wittgenstein’s On Certainty, where the idea of hinge 
commitments originates. On the basis of those scattered fragments, 
Pritchard reconstructs Wittgenstein as claiming that one does not 
have knowledge that one is not in a sceptical scenario, but also that 
it is not possible to doubt that one’s beliefs are generally correct. 
Doubt, and hence rational evaluation, can only be local, i.e., they 
concern only some non-basic beliefs. For Wittgenstein, there are ba-
sic beliefs that cannot be rationally justified (or doubted), because 
they are no less plausible than any claim that might be called upon in 
support of them. These are called hinge commitments. A belief that one 
is not a brain in a vat is a good example of such a basic, unjustifiable 
claim. Pritchard takes this intuition as the starting point for his own 
anti-sceptical strategy. However, he indicates an interesting problem 
that threatens Wittgenstein’s theory (and some of its modern inter-
pretations too).
The problem is that Wittgenstein’s theory is incompatible with 
closure. Consider the following reasoning:
(1) There is a desk in front of me.
(2) If there is a desk in front of me, I am not a brain in a vat.
(3) I am not a brain in a vat.
This is an instance of modus ponens, and as such, it is an example 
of valid reasoning. In this example, (1) is a mundane case of percep-
tual knowledge and (2) is true on the basis of how a brain in a vat is 
described. If one knows these premises, one competently deduces 
the conclusion on the basis of them and as a result of this deduction, 
one forms the belief in the conclusion: in virtue of the principle of 
closure, one knows the conclusion. Since Wittgenstein argues that 
there is no deductive knowledge of hinge commitments, he must 
reject closure.
To avoid this clash with closure, Pritchard proposes the non-be-
lief reading of hinge commitments (p. 90-4). He argues that having 
a hinge commitment should be understood propositionally, i.e., as 
having some attitude towards a proposition. One has hinge com-
Book Reviews306
mitments to propositions (called hinge propositions) that codify one’s 
single, über hinge commitment: that one is not fundamentally and mas-
sively mistaken in one’s beliefs (I will comment on the codification 
relation later). The trick that solves the closure problem is that the 
subject has an attitude different from belief towards hinge proposi-
tions (since Pritchard does not offer a name for it, for the purpose 
of this review I will call it the non-belief attitude). The (CLOSURE) 
formulation of the closure principle only concerns cases in which the 
subject forms a belief. Therefore, closure does not apply to cases of 
deductions which end with hinge propositions, because, according 
to Pritchard, one has some other attitude towards hinge commit-
ments: not belief. Therefore, all three elements of the closure-based 
triad are consistent after all, and there is no tension that can generate 
a paradox.
This short reconstruction helps to reveal some obscurities within 
Pritchard’s account. My main concern is that the book seems to lack 
a positive characterisation of the non-belief attitude. The negative 
characteristic of this attitude is that it is not knowledge-apt, hence 
the crucial difference from belief (p. 90); and this feature is what 
Pritchard needs to avoid application of closure to non-believed hinge 
propositions. Meanwhile, positive description is limited to the claim 
that non-belief is belief-like in the sense of being incompatible with 
an agnostic attitude towards the truth of the proposition in question 
(p. 101). The only passage in the book in which I found more precise 
information on how Pritchard understands an agnostic attitude is the 
fragment in which he contrasts his own approach with Wright’s en-
titlement reading of hinge commitments (p. 77-84). According to 
Pritchard, rational trust, as defined by Wright, is indeed compatible 
with the an agnostic attitude (in contrast to Wright’s intentions):
The crux of the matter, however, is whether the rational trust in ques-
tion really could legitimately exclude agnosticism about the truth of the 
target proposition. The reason why this is problematic is that it is hard 
to see how an agent who is fully aware that she has no rational basis for 
regarding the target proposition as true could be anything but agnostic 
about that proposition. After all, isn’t the recognition that this rational 
basis is lacking simply tantamount to being agnostic about the truth of 
this proposition? How could it be otherwise? (p. 82)
However, what is not clear to me is how Pritchard’s own theory 
avoids the same problem. According to Pritchard, a subject who is com-
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mitted to a hinge proposition does not have rational justification for it 
either. In what respect that subject’s predicament differs from the situ-
ation of someone who “is fully aware that she has no rational basis for 
regarding the target proposition as true” is not explained and far from 
evident. Is she unaware that she has no rational basis for regarding the 
hinge proposition true? This seems rather implausible; and Pritchard 
does not commit himself to any such claim. Thus, until we are told 
more concerning the non-belief and/or agnosticism, it is not clear how 
an attitude of non-belief is incompatible with an agnostic stance.
Moreover, the distinctness of attitudes of non-belief and belief is 
not precisely established either. Pritchard describes the difference 
between belief and non-belief thus:
Crucially, however, insofar as we accept that such a commitment [hinge 
commitment — B.C.] is merely codifying the prior über hinge com-
mitment, a commitment that is not the result of a rational process or 
even in principle responsive to rational processes, then the anti-skepti-
cal hinge commitment is also very different from belief in fundamental 
respects. (p. 101)
Therefore, the bulk of explaining the rationale behind postulat-
ing the existence of a different type of attitude towards hinge com-
mitments results from the fact that a hinge commitment is the result 
of codiication of an über hinge commitment. However, it is not clear 
how codification actually works. Everybody, according to Pritchard, 
has the über hinge commitment; but different subjects have different 
hinge commitments that codify the über hinge commitment. More-
over, the list of commitments a given subject has may vary during 
that subject’s lifetime (p. 94-7). What I find to be missing is an ex-
planation of what processes result in the subject’s performing certain 
codifications of the über hinge commitment — and not some others. 
Pritchard only claims that this issue is “highly context-sensitive” (p. 
95). There seems to be an explanatory gap here. If I understand the 
passage quoted above correctly, Pritchard attempts to define non-
belief in opposition to belief, by contrasting processes that gener-
ate these attitudes. One acquires beliefs as a result of various belief-
forming processes such as deduction; while one’s hinge commitments 
arise as a result of codification of the über hinge commitment. Until 
we are told in more detail what processes are responsible for codifi-
cation, we are also in the dark about what the non-belief attitude is 
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and exactly in what respects it is distinct from belief.
The third caveat is that Pritchard, in order to block the closure-
based paradox, must establish that non-believing that p excludes be-
lieving that p. This cannot be taken for granted or stipulated. Some 
attitudes seem to be compatible with belief. I can, for instance, 
hope that I will catch the train home this evening and at the same 
time believe that I will catch it. Belief and non-belief differ in their 
knowledge-aptness; but it must be established that if one has a non-
knowledge-apt non-belief attitude, then one cannot (simultaneously 
or at some later moment) have a knowledge-apt belief attitude. It 
cannot simply be assumed that once one non-believes that p, then 
one cannot at some point start to believe that p.
Having presented my worries concerning the non-belief attitude, 
I would like to point out an interesting argument raised by Pritchard 
to criticise an externalist response to closure-based paradox, which 
consists of denial of (1) in such a paradox:
(1) one cannot know that one is not a brain in a vat.
Externalists grant the subject knowledge of not being a brain in a 
vat, yet deny that this knowledge has rational grounds. In response, 
Pritchard argues that one can formulate the principle of closure and 
closure paradox in a way that is analogous to the previous presen-
tation, just by replacing the concept of knowledge with rationally 
grounded knowledge (p. 22-3):
(1) One cannot have rationally grounded knowledge that one is 
not a brain in a vat.
(2) If one cannot have rationally grounded knowledge that one is 
not a brain in a vat, then one cannot have rationally grounded 
knowledge that one is sitting at one’s desk.
(3) One has rationally grounded knowledge that one is sitting at 
one’s desk.
(CLOSURE-RK) If S has rationally grounded knowledge that p, 
and S competently deduces from p that q, thereby forming a belief 
that q on this basis while retaining her rationally grounded knowl-
edge that p, then S has rationally grounded knowledge that q.
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Now, externalists face a dilemma. It is difficult to see how they 
could reject (1); (2) is an application of closure; and rejection of (3) 
is a bold move with an inconvenient consequence: although there 
is knowledge of mundane facts, this knowledge is not rationally 
grounded. This completely disconnects knowledge from rational 
ground for it; which is a very revisionary move.
Epistemic Angst is an interesting and thought-provoking book. It 
presents an ambitious attempt to refute scepticism, which is sup-
posed to be in agreement with our intuitions, purging them of 
philosophical claims which give rise to paradoxes. The discussion of 
two types of scepticism is very insightful and carefully conducted, 
while the idea of combining hinge commitments and disjunctivism 
in responding to them is promising. However, Pritchard’s answer to 
closure-based theory relies on the non-belief reading of hinge com-
mitments, which currently is not described well enough to equip it 
for the task.
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